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Religions promote cooperation but they can also be divisive. Is religious cooperation intuitively 33 
parochial against atheists? Evidence supporting the social heuristics hypothesis (SHH) suggests that 34 
cooperation is intuitive independent of religious group identity. We test this prediction in a one-shot 35 
prisoner’s dilemma game, where 1,280 practicing Christian believers are paired either with a 36 
coreligionist or an atheist and where time-limits are used to increase reliance on either intuitive or 37 
deliberated decisions. We explored another dual-process account of cooperation, the self-control 38 
account (SCA), which suggests that visceral reactions tend to be selfish and that cooperation requires 39 
deliberation. We found evidence for religious parochialism but no support for SHH’s prediction of 40 
intuitive cooperation. Consistent with SCA but requiring confirmation in future studies, exploratory 41 
analyses showed that religious parochialism involves decision conflict and concern for strong 42 
reciprocity and that deliberation promotes cooperation independent of religious group identity.  43 
 44 
Main 45 
Many world religions have scriptures and rituals that regulate prosocial behaviour. It is perhaps not a 46 
coincidence that the expansion of large-scale cooperative networks coexisted with the emergence and 47 
spread of these religious teachings and practices1–4. Historical records, cross-cultural studies, and 48 
laboratory results indicate that religious belief promotes cooperation, at least among believers3,5–7. This 49 
widespread cultural phenomenon may be an evolutionary adaptation or a by-product8. However, it is 50 
not yet clear whether the cooperativeness of religious believers is general (i.e., inclusive of out-groups) 51 
or whether it is parochial (i.e., biased against out-groups)9–12. The distinction is crucial to ongoing 52 
debates on the role of religion in the public sphere13,14, since parochialism emphasizes the need to 53 
protect religious minorities and secular institutions. Furthermore, the form that these protections 54 
should take (e.g., behavioural interventions or “nudges”) depends on the cognitive underpinnings of the 55 
phenomena in question, such as whether religious discrimination is intuitive (e.g., relying on 56 
spontaneous associations and simple heuristics) and whether it is amenable to change through 57 
deliberation.  58 
Cooperation often requires one to make a personal sacrifice for the sake of group benefit. 59 
Various psychological and social mechanisms have been put forward to explain how religious belief 60 
promotes cooperation. Belief in god can increase cooperation in social dilemmas through motivational 61 
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mechanisms that counteract incentives to freeride. Such changes in incentive structures can be achieved 62 
through religious teachings of benevolence15 as well as through fear of a punitive and omnipotent 63 
god16,17. Consistent with this motivational view, the psychological salience of religious and punitive 64 
concepts have been found to increase altruism towards anonymous others18,19, and regular attendance 65 
at religious services has been associated with charitable giving20. Religious belief can also support 66 
cooperation through its positive effects on trust and the consequent coordination of behavior9. Given 67 
the prosociality of religious behavioural norms and the fear of punishment for their violation, social 68 
identity as a religious believer works as a valuable signal of trustworthiness in reciprocal social 69 
interactions. Because most people in social dilemmas are willing to cooperate conditionally (i.e., to the 70 
extent that they believe others will cooperate)21–24, religious identity further strengthens cooperation9,25, 71 
particularly in religious social networks26–28. 72 
In short, religious belief promotes cooperation, especially when religious identity is a reliable 73 
signal of trustworthiness and prosociality. However, personal benefits of signalling religiosity expose 74 
religious identity to exploitation by free-riders posing as religious believers. This threat is often 75 
countered by costly displays of faith (e.g., regular participation in religious public rituals), which help 76 
screen out those without genuine belief in god (or fear of supernatural punishment) for whom the 77 
psychological costs of participation are often too high6. The consequent increase in the reliability of this 78 
socially valuable information may, however, come at the cost of increased distrust and systematic 79 
discrimination against atheists and believers of other religions.  80 
The evidence remains mixed regarding the question of whether religious prosociality is general 81 
or parochial. Whereas widespread anti-atheist prejudice suggests parochialism9,11, some studies find 82 
that religiosity increases altruism and cooperativeness in general12, even towards atheists10. Recent 83 
cross-cultural evidence for the parochialism of religious belief further suggests that religious prejudice 84 
may be intuitive, taking shape through spontaneous associations11,29. These findings motivate us to ask 85 
whether intuitive religious biases in judgments extend to behavioural biases in cooperation, namely, 86 
whether religious cooperation is intuitively parochial, and whether deliberation helps to reduce such 87 
discrimination. 88 
The primary goal of our study is to investigate the extent to which the Social Heuristics 89 
Hypothesis (SHH) provides answers to these questions. Built on the background of dual-process models 90 
of the mind30, SHH posits that social decisions can be driven either by more intuitive and low-effort or by 91 
more deliberated and high-effort cognitive processes31–33. According to SHH, intuitive decisions reflect 92 
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simple heuristics acquired in previous social interactions, which tend to be cooperative32. Supporting 93 
SHH, cognitive process manipulations that enhance intuitive thinking (such as time-pressure, cognitive-94 
load or priming) have been shown to increase cooperation in games involving social dilemmas31,32,34–36. 95 
Furthermore, previous tests of SHH among natural and minimal groups showed both strong group bias 96 
and intuitive cooperation but no interaction between cognitive and group manipulations34,37–39. 97 
Consequently, accumulated evidence for SHH supports the hypothesis that cooperation is intuitive in 98 
general (i.e., independent of group identity). 99 
We tested the generality of intuitive cooperation by observing cooperation behaviour of 100 
practicing religious believers in a one-shot continuous prisoner’s dilemma (PD) game40,41. In the PD 101 
game, a pair of participants individually and simultaneously decides how much of an initial monetary 102 
endowment to keep for themselves and, as our measure of cooperation, how much to give to the other 103 
participant, where any money given is doubled before being transferred. PD constitutes a social 104 
dilemma by making personal monetary sacrifice necessary for increasing the pair’s total earnings. In the 105 
PD game, practicing Christians were randomly paired with either a coreligionist (In-Group) or an atheist 106 
(Out-Group), and PD decisions were elicited either under 10s time-pressure (TP, for inducing decisions 107 
that are relatively more intuitive) or under 20s time-delay (TD, for inducing decisions that are relatively 108 
more deliberated). Hence, we study group bias in cooperation among practicing believers by randomly 109 
manipulating the religious identity of their pair in the PD game, while at the same time manipulating the 110 
cognitive processes involved in their PD decision. 111 
H1: Believers will be intuitively cooperative in general such that those assigned to the intuition 112 
condition (TP) will be more cooperative than those assigned to the deliberation condition (TD) 113 
independent of the religious identity of their pairs. We seek evidence for H1 by jointly testing for 114 
intuitive cooperation (i.e., the main effect of time-limits in the hypothesized direction) and for its 115 
generality (i.e., the lack of an interaction effect with a pair’s religious identity) (see Methods). 116 
In contrast to the above-mentioned evidence supporting SHH, the generalizability of the 117 
phenomenon of intuitive cooperation has been questioned42,43. Since cooperative heuristics thrive in 118 
contexts of routine cooperation and wither with routine exposure to selfishness44–46, a likely explanation 119 
for the strength of intuitive cooperation is variation in background social experiences and the 120 
consequent differences in social heuristics32,47.  121 
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A secondary goal of our study is to explore whether an alternative approach, the Self-Control 122 
Account (SCA), can provide further insights into the psychology of cooperation. SCA posits that 123 
automatic visceral reactions are often selfish and that cooperation requires effortful deliberation and 124 
self-control48. Regular participation in communal religious practices may result in experiences where 125 
prosociality and trust towards coreligionists emerge as a cooperative heuristic, and where atheism may 126 
be (even if implicitly) associated with selfishness and distrust. For a believer, the identity of an 127 
interaction partner as a practicing coreligionist would then cue cooperative heuristics, while the 128 
prospect of interacting with an atheist may cue selfishness26. Particularly for this latter case, SCA 129 
suggests that deliberation increases cooperation by allowing control over visceral selfish reactions48–50 130 
and by encouraging impartial moral judgments of fairness and equality51–53. Nevertheless, with few 131 
exceptions (e.g., Isler, Gächter, Maule & Starmer, unpublished manuscript), evidence supporting SCA 132 
remains correlational and suggestive. Support for our exploratory analysis of SCA would provide a basis 133 
for future confirmatory hypothesis tests.  134 
Our study provides a strong test of SHH in the context of naturally occurring (and possibly 135 
contrasting) heuristics. It also allows exploration, based on suggestive evidence for SCA, of whether 136 
religious cooperation behaviour is intuitively parochial. A more nuanced dual-process account of 137 
parochialism in cooperation would also be possible if, for example, SHH were valid only for in-group 138 
while SCA were valid only for out-group behaviour. The intuitive cooperation account of SHH, however, 139 
predicts intuitive cooperation independent of whether the recipient is in-group, out-group or without 140 
group identity. While the In-Group and Out-Group conditions provide a comparison of these contrasting 141 
predictions, we also ran a control condition without identity manipulation (No-Group) allowing a test of 142 
SHH as in the original studies31. We surmised that the comparison of SHH’s deliberated selfishness 143 
account with SCA’s deliberated cooperation account may help us discover whether deliberation can be 144 
employed to mitigate intuitive religious parochialism. 145 
Results 146 
We recruited 1,280 practicing Christian believers and 1,280 atheists on the online platform Prolific (see 147 
Participants in Methods). Our analysis does not focus on the atheist participants, who were recruited to 148 
avoid deception. The number of religious believers in our sample did not statistically differ across the six 149 
experimental conditions, χ2 (2, n = 1,280) = 2.775, P = .250. These six groups were similar in their main 150 
demographic features (see Supplementary Table 1). Consistent with previous social dilemma 151 
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experiments, a Shapiro-Wilk test indicated that cooperation by believers in the PD game was not 152 
normally distributed, W(1280) = 0.98, P < .001. The distribution of cooperation was trimodal, with 12.3% 153 
of religious believers giving none, 19.5% giving half and 39.3% giving all of their endowment to the other 154 
participant. We use statistical tests that are standard in and appropriate for the analysis of social 155 
dilemma experiments with large number of observations. All tests are two-tailed, except for ANOVAs, χ2 156 
tests and equivalence testing that are based on single-tailed distributions by design. We report 95% 157 
confidence intervals in brackets, except for equivalence testing (see Methods). 158 
Manipulation checks. Compliance with time-limits among religious believers was 81.0% in TP and 81.9% 159 
in TD. Response times under TP (MD = 6.95 s, SD = 7.30) were faster than under TD (MD = 26.36, SD = 160 
115.7), Wilcoxon rank-sum, z = 26.53, P < .001, d = 0.31, 95% CI [0.20, 0.42]. The composite of two self-161 
report questions on the effects of time-limits on cognitive processes (i.e., having limited time to think 162 
and deciding based on ‘gut reaction’) was higher under TP (M = 3.12, SD = 1.01) than TD (M = 2.47, SD = 163 
0.82), t(1278) = 12.75, P < .001, d = 0.71 [0.60, 0.83]. Religious believers in the group identity conditions 164 
(see Fig. 1) reported higher subjective closeness to their pairs in the In-Group condition (M = 3.46, SD = 165 
1.94) than in the Out-Group condition (M = 2.72, SD = 1.63), t(862) = 6.10, P < .001, d = 0.42 [0.28, 0.55]. 166 
Hence, these three preregistered tests indicate that our manipulations worked as intended.  167 
Preregistered analysis. Fig. 2 depicts the behaviour of practicing Christians in the PD across the 168 
experimental conditions. A two-way ANOVA on the group identity conditions indicated higher 169 
cooperation towards in-group than out-group pairs (with point estimate of MIn-Group - MOut-Group = 3.91 170 
[0.41, 7.72]), F(1, 860) = 3.98, P = .046, ηp2 = .005 (0, .018]. However, we failed to provide evidence for 171 
general intuitive cooperation (H1) predicted by SHH; there was no main effect of time-limits on 172 
cooperation (MTD - MTP = 3.26 [-0.29, 6.81]), F(1, 860) = 2.19, P = .140, ηp2 = .003 [0, .014]. There was also 173 
no significant interaction, F(1, 860) = 1.23, P = .267, ηp2 = .001 [0, .011]. The No-Group conditions, 174 
estimated separately to test SHH as in the original studies, also did not reveal any evidence for intuitive 175 
cooperation (MTD - MTP = 2.16 [-1.38, 5.70]), t(414) = 1.20, P = .231, d = 0.12 [-0.08, 0.31].  176 
The lack of evidence for intuitive cooperation rendered irrelevant the equivalence test planned 177 
to check generality of intuitive cooperation (see Methods), which we report for completeness: the upper 178 
bound of the 90% CI for the interaction effect size (η2 = 0.009) was less than the smallest effect size of 179 
interest (SESOI = 0.012). Bayesian analysis with default priors is consistent with the equivalence test 180 
result and provides strong support for the null hypothesis (BF10 = 0.023). 181 
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Exploratory analysis. Here, we explore the effect of time-limits on cooperation decisions from the 182 
contrasting perspectives of SHH (predicting intuitive cooperation) and SCA (predicting intuitive 183 
selfishness). For this purpose, we use four two-way ANOVA models (M1a-M4a). Unlike the confirmatory 184 
analysis and to achieve more powerful tests, these exploratory models include all experimental 185 
conditions, reflecting the broader 2 (TP or TD) by 3 (In-Group, Out-Group or No-Group) experimental 186 
design. The first model (M1a) uses the complete sample of 1,280 practicing Christians, whereas the next 187 
three models are based on subsamples excluding (M2a) those who reported being experienced with PD 188 
experiments, (M3a) those who did not comprehend the social dilemma or (M4a) those who did not self-189 
describe as practicing Christians during data collection. Whenever possible, the models include 190 
experience with PD experiments and two questions measuring social dilemma comprehension as 191 
preregistered control variables (see Control Measures in Methods). In the overall sample (i.e., M1a), 192 
cooperation was negatively correlated with understanding of the self-gain maximization strategy (r = -193 
.072 [-.126, -.017], P = .010) and positively correlated with understanding of the group-gain 194 
maximization strategy (r = .212 [.159, .264], P < .001) but it was not significantly correlated with PD 195 
experience (r = -.027 [-.082, .028], P = .332). While M1a and M4a control for all three variables, due to 196 
exclusions, M2a controls only for the understanding measures, and M3a controls only for experience. 197 
Next, we describe these models in more detail. 198 
Experience with economic games has been shown to weaken intuitive cooperation32,47. In 199 
response to a replication attempt that failed to find evidence for SHH among Amazon Mechanical Turk 200 
participants,43 evidence for intuitive cooperation emerged when the sample was restricted to those 201 
17.2% who had no experience with economic games.47 We recruited practicing Christians on Prolific, 202 
most of whom reported inexperience with the PD experiments (74.1%). M2a restricts the analysis to 203 
these 948 inexperienced participants.  204 
We measured social dilemma comprehension with two standard questions about (1) the 205 
monetary self-gain maximization strategy (63.5% correct) and (2) the monetary group-gain maximization 206 
strategy (78.7% correct). In line with previous findings showing that time-pressure does not harm 207 
understanding,35,54 the rate of social dilemma comprehension—those correctly answering both 208 
questions—did not differ between the time-limit conditions (56.3% in TD and 55.1% in TP), χ2 (1, n = 209 
1,280) = 0.179, P = .672. On the other hand, restricting analysis to those with comprehension of the 210 
game rules has previously supported SCA54. Therefore, M3a is restricted to the analysis of 713 211 
participants with PD comprehension.  212 
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The information used as sample selection criteria was previously elicited by Prolific, which could 213 
have been outdated at the time of the study. The survey elicited as part of our study revealed that, 214 
among the 1,280 recruits, 52 no longer self-identified as Christian believers and a further 178 declared 215 
they no longer regularly participated in religious public ceremonies. M4a restricts the sample to 1,050 216 
current practicing Christian believers.  217 
Table 1 describes the cooperation rates of believers and treatment effects across the four 218 
models. Contrary to SHH and in support of SCA, and as visualised in Fig. 3., cooperation was higher 219 
under TD than under TP for each group identity condition across all four models. On average, 220 
cooperation was higher under TD than under TP by 6.4% in M1a, 5.0% in M2a, 12.6% in M3a, and 7.1% 221 
in M4a. The main effect of time-limits on cooperation was statistically significant for three models 222 
including (M1a) the complete sample of believers, F(1, 1271) = 4.83, P = .028; (M3a) those with social 223 
dilemma comprehension, F(1, 706) = 6.12, P = .014; and (M4a) those who satisfied the screening criteria 224 
at the time of the study, F(1, 1041) = 4.17, P = .041. Even among believers who were inexperienced with 225 
the PD game (M2a), where statistical estimates did not provide clear evidence for SHH or SCA, F(1, 940) 226 
= 2.92, P = .088, there was no evidence of a decrease in cooperation with deliberation (see Fig. 3). The 227 
main effect of group identity manipulation was weakened with the inclusion of the No-Group condition 228 
into the analysis, and was significant only in M3a, F(2, 706) = 3.14, P = .044. Likewise, evidence for SCA 229 
did not seem to depend on religious group identity, as the interaction effect was not significant in any of 230 
the models, Ps ≥ .330 (but this may also stem from a lack of statistical power in detecting small 231 
interaction effects).  232 
To further evaluate the robustness of these exploratory findings and increase the power of the 233 
associated statistical tests, we estimated modified versions of the four models described above that 234 
included all participants in our experiment—not only the believers but also the atheists. The modified 235 
models (M1b to M4b) have the same configuration as initial models (M1a to M4a) but additionally 236 
include participant type as an independent factor, involving 2 (believer or atheist) by 2 (TP or TD) by 3 237 
(In-Group, Out-Group, or No-Group) three-way ANOVAs: As detailed in Table 2, the evidence for SCA 238 
was robust to the inclusion of atheists in the analysis, resulting in significant main effect of time-limits 239 
on cooperation in all four models. Specifically, cooperation was higher under TD than under TP (M1b) by 240 
4.2% in the complete sample, F(1, 2545) = 4.96, P = .026; (M2b) by 5.5% among those inexperienced 241 
with the PD game, F(1, 1823) = 5.95, P = .015; (M3b) by 6.7% among those with social dilemma 242 
comprehension, F(1, 1574) = 4.75, P = .003; and (M4b) by 4.3% among those who currently identify as 243 
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either practicing Christian or atheist, F(1, 2225) = 4.03, P = .045. All four models showed a significant 244 
main effect of group identity manipulation (Ps ≤ .009), but none of the models indicated a significant 245 
main effect of participant type (Ps ≥ .396) nor interactions between any of the factors (Ps ≥ .142). 246 
Finally, using two measures elicited after the PD—decision conflict and expected cooperation—247 
we explore the cognitive drivers of religious parochialism in cooperation. Since these were elicited 248 
without time-limits, we focus here on the effect of group identity manipulations. Decision conflict 249 
measures, on a scale ranging from 0 to 100, the difficulty of choosing how much to keep and how much 250 
to share with one’s partner in the PD55, providing in our context a subjective correlate of religious 251 
parochialism. In both conditions, decision conflict experienced by religious believers showed small-to-252 
moderate negative correlation with cooperation behaviour (In-Group: r = -.201 [-.291, -.107], P < .001; 253 
Out-Group: r = -.152 [-.242, -.060], P = .001). Believers found it easier to cooperate with coreligionists 254 
than atheists, as they reported experiencing stronger feelings of decision conflict in the Out-Group 255 
condition (M = 37.85, SD = 32.43) than in the In-Group condition (M = 33.04, SD = 30.57), t(862) = 2.24, P 256 
= .025, d = 0.15 [0.02, 0.29]. These two findings together suggest that cognitive processes of decision 257 
conflict are involved in religious parochialism in cooperation.  258 
Expected cooperation, on the other hand, measures participants’ beliefs regarding the 259 
cooperation decisions of their pairs in the PD game23,56. This measure allows exploration of whether 260 
strong reciprocity—the motivation to cooperate at personal cost conditional on the belief that others 261 
will do so as well57—drives religious parochialism in cooperation. Actual and expected cooperation were 262 
highly correlated for religious believers interacting with both coreligionists (r = .745 [.699, .785], P < 263 
.001) and atheists (r = .684 [.632, .731], P < .001). Furthermore, these participants expected their in-264 
group coreligionist PD pairs to be more cooperative towards them (M = 30.00, SD = 16.51) than their 265 
out-group atheist pairs (M = 26.56, SD = 17.40), t(862) = 2.97, P = .003, d = 0.20 [0.07, 0.34]. These 266 
results suggest that strong reciprocity is a primary driver of religious parochialism in cooperation 267 
identified in the confirmatory analysis.  268 
Discussion 269 
We studied Christian believers who regularly participated in public religious rituals, since regular social 270 
interactions among coreligionists can be expected to result in cooperative heuristics towards in-group 271 
members. Contributing to the debates about the role of religion in the public sphere reviewed 272 
earlier13,14, we found evidence for parochialism based on religious identity, with Christians cooperating 273 
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more with coreligionists than with atheists. However, we failed to find support for generalized intuitive 274 
cooperation (H1). This hypothesis, derived from SHH
31–33 and implied by recent findings34, predicts that 275 
Christian believers assigned to the intuition condition (TP) would be more cooperative than those 276 
assigned to the deliberation condition (TD) independent of the religious identity of their pairs. Neither 277 
was there any support for SHH in conditions where no group identity was revealed, which were run to 278 
provide comparability with the original studies. At least at first sight, our results are consistent with the 279 
interpretation emerging from the accumulated evidence that intuitive cooperation is either non-existent 280 
overall58 or small in effect size when time-pressure manipulations are used59.  281 
 Our exploratory analyses, on the other hand, provided evidence for intuitive selfishness as 282 
predicted by SCA. Across three of the four models tested among believers, including a model with the 283 
complete sample of participants and a model restricted to Christian believers actively practicing at the 284 
time of the study, cooperation was found to increase with deliberation independent of group identity. 285 
These models used all experimental conditions to increase statistical power (including those without 286 
group identity information), and where applicable, they controlled for the preregistered covariates of 287 
experience with and comprehension of the PD game. The model that provided strongest evidence for 288 
SCA restricted the analysis to those who comprehended the social dilemma underlying the PD. Even in 289 
the model that failed to provide conclusive evidence (M2a), where those with experience in the PD 290 
game were excluded from analysis, average cooperation was higher when participants were encouraged 291 
to deliberate. Furthermore, the main effect of time-limits was significant in the direction of SCA when 292 
four additional models were estimated using all participants—both believers and atheists. These 293 
exploratory findings highlight the need for future confirmatory tests of SCA. One should also be cautious 294 
interpreting estimates based on restricted subsamples since these exclusions are open to annulment of 295 
random assignment and to sample selection bias60. Nevertheless, while we found no confirmatory 296 
evidence for SHH in any of our models, our study provides support for SCA when considering the 297 
complete sample of participants. 298 
How can we reconcile the evidence supporting SCA in our exploratory analyses and elsewhere in 299 
the literature48,54,55,61 with previous support for SHH31,34–36? Pointing towards a resolution, we note that 300 
the two phenomena—intuitive cooperation predicted by SHH and intuitive selfishness predicted by 301 
SCA—have different premises regarding the underlying social and cognitive processes. While SHH relies 302 
on mental shortcuts developed during past social interactions, SCA points towards a primordial—visceral 303 
and instinctive—response for self-protection62. In principle, the two effects can therefore coexist in 304 
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varying magnitudes across decision-making contexts such that, overall, one may dominate the other. As 305 
they may also cancel each other out, these two independent mechanisms can also explain the overall 306 
weak or null effect of tests of intuitive cooperation behaviour in social dilemmas42,58,59. Therefore, 307 
procedures for disentangling the two phenomena are needed for conducting independent tests of SCA 308 
and SHH. For example, to allow relatively isolated tests of SHH, social heuristics can be developed in the 309 
laboratory by repeated exposure to cooperative social dilemma environments44,46. Similarly, cultural 310 
comparisons can help identify social contexts where cooperative heuristics are prevalent45,63, and 311 
framing manipulations can help identify the contextual cues that trigger them64. 312 
 Novel procedures that independently test SCA are also needed. A potential candidate relates to 313 
the ongoing debate about whether miscomprehension of the social dilemma confounds tests of intuitive 314 
cooperation54,65–67. Other things being equal, systematic misperception of the experimental task is 315 
methodologically undesirable, since participants with misperceptions may be playing a different game 316 
than intended by the researchers. However, SHH predicts intuitive cooperation in part because of such a 317 
misperception. Accordingly, people develop prosocial heuristics since regular cooperation among 318 
affiliates tends to be self-serving, but deliberation will reveal cooperation to be a mistake in the 319 
particular case of anonymous one-shot games. In this sense, the misperception that the one-shot PD 320 
game does not involve a social dilemma is arguably a necessary condition for observing support for SHH. 321 
Hence, providing extensive instructions about the dilemma and screening participants based on 322 
comprehension (e.g., using control questions68) can provide independent tests of SCA by minimizing 323 
intuitive cooperation due to social heuristics. Consistent with this argument as well as with previous 324 
findings in the literature54, our model that excluded participants with social dilemma miscomprehension 325 
provided no evidence for SHH and showed even stronger exploratory evidence for SCA.  326 
We initially asked whether cooperation depends on religious group identity and whether 327 
religious parochialism in cooperation has an intuitive basis. Although religious believers in our sample 328 
did not exhibit intuitive cooperation, they were parochial, giving more to coreligionists than to atheists 329 
in the PD game. Exploratory tests provided suggestive evidence that strong reciprocity, and to some 330 
extent decision conflict, drive religious parochialism in cooperation. In other words, believers tend to 331 
cooperate more with coreligionists than atheists because they expect coreligionists to be more 332 
cooperative, and because they feel less conflicted when making such a decision. While this goes against 333 
recent findings of generalized religious prosociality10, it is consistent with strong meta-analytic evidence 334 
for in-group favouritism in cooperation across various domains69. 335 
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Our experimental protocol, used to manipulate group identity, is likely to have influenced our 336 
finding on religious parochialism. We used a quasi-naturalistic setting, where an online profile was used 337 
to reveal multiple group identity attributes simultaneously, thereby mimicking the social media profiles 338 
people regularly use to learn about others (see Fig. 1). In our case, the religious group identity of ones’ 339 
partner in the PD game was varied to induce in-group and out-group manipulations, while country of 340 
residence, age group, language, and recruitment platform membership were kept constant across the 341 
group identity conditions. The use of a profile has the advantage of increased ecological validity and it 342 
can limit socially desirable responding by obscuring the manipulation. However, this comes at the cost 343 
of weakening the experimental manipulation (i.e., religious affiliation). Although we did find evidence 344 
for in-group favouritism, the effect size was smaller than that found in the literature, indicating that it 345 
may have been dampened by the presence of other in-group attributes. In particular, the country of 346 
residence as an in-group attribute may have evoked strong binding reactions by cuing nationality. Future 347 
research on parochialism should vary multiple attributes to estimate the importance of religious identity 348 
relative to others. 349 
In conclusion, our study provides exploratory support for SCA but this does not necessarily 350 
refute SHH because the two accounts refer to different social and cognitive processes. Future research is 351 
needed to improve our understanding of the economic and psychological factors that determine which 352 
of the two phenomena—intuitive cooperation or intuitive selfishness—is likely to be dominant in a given 353 
decision context. Without this understanding, the question remains open as to when public policies 354 
should appeal to intuition and when they should appeal to deliberation. We initially sought in this 355 
project to investigate whether parochialism can be weakened by policies that promote deliberation. 356 
While we found no evidence for an intuitive basis for religious discrimination, our results suggest that 357 
nudging deliberation can promote cooperation independent of group identity.  358 
Methods 359 
Overview 360 
Our research complies with all relevant ethical regulations. Ethics approval was obtained from the 361 
University of Leeds Research Ethics Committee, and informed consent was received from participants at 362 
the outset of the study. An incentivized prisoner’s dilemma (PD) game was used to study cooperation 363 
behaviour. Participants were recruited from previously self-declared practicing Christians and atheists, 364 
who were randomly assigned to one of six conditions while playing the PD game. Data on atheists are 365 
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not analysed here in detail since this study focuses on the decisions of Christian participants. The 366 
experiment involved a 3 (religious group identity of one’s pair in the game: practicing Christian, atheist 367 
or no identity) by 2 (time-limit: 10s time-pressure or 20s time-delay) between-subjects design. Each 368 
participant was randomly assigned to one of six experimental conditions. Participants and the 369 
researchers were blind to the conditions of the experiment during data collection. All manipulation 370 
checks and applicable control measures showed that the manipulations worked as intended. 371 
Power Analysis 372 
We estimated our sample size based on the hypothesized main effect, and let this sample size 373 
determine the smallest effect size that can be detected for the hypothesized lack of an interaction 374 
effect. To do so, we used the most relevant effect size for the main effect of time-limit manipulations 375 
found in the literature35—a test of SHH on a sample recruited from Prolific using a similar protocol (f = 376 
0.11). Because the one-shot PD game does not involve interaction or feedback, each individual decision 377 
in the game constitutes an independent observation. To detect a main effect of time-limit of this size in 378 
a two-way ANOVA model with α = 0.05 and 1 - β = 0.95, we estimated using G*Power 3.1.9.2 that our 379 
sample should consist of at least 1280 believers70. Sensitivity analysis indicated that the minimum 380 
interaction effect size that can be detected in a two-way ANOVA model with n = 1280, α = 0.05 and 1 - β 381 
= 0.95 is η2 = 0.012, which we took to be our smallest effect size of interest (SESOI)71,72. Although we 382 
focus on the behaviour of believers, we avoided deception by also recruiting 1280 atheists, who were 383 
paired either with each other or with believers in the PD game. 384 
Hypothesis Tests 385 
In a two-way ANOVA model of the PD decisions of religious believers on religious identity and time-limit 386 
factors, H1 would be supported by evidence (1) for intuitive cooperation in a null-hypothesis significance 387 
test (i.e., significant main effect of time-limits on cooperation such that cooperation is higher under 388 
time-pressure than under time-delay) and (2) for the generality of intuitive cooperation in a one-tailed 389 
equivalence test showing lack of a significant interaction effect. While step (1) is operationalized as 390 
indicating evidence if p < 0.05, evidence in step (2) would be indicated by the upper bound of the 90% 391 
confidence interval of the interaction effect size (η2) being less than 0.012 (i.e., excluding the SESOI). In 392 
step (2), we also calculate a Bayes Factor (BF) for the interaction effect as confirmation such that BF ≤ 393 
1/3 is interpreted as substantial evidence for the null result.73 394 
Participants  395 
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We recruited participants from Prolific (https://prolific.co/) and conducted our experiment online. Data 396 
generated online, including Prolific, has been shown to replicate various well-established laboratory 397 
results74,75, including incentivized games measuring cooperation76. We used Prolific because it allows 398 
prescreening based on a previously completed comprehensive demographic questionnaire, including 399 
religious affiliation and practices. Participants were adult US residents fluent in English. We report data 400 
on 1,280 practicing Christians, recruited among those who in the Prolific questionnaire answered 401 
“Christianity” for the question “What is your religious affiliation?” and chose either “Yes. Both public 402 
and private.” or “Yes. Public only.” for the question “Do you participate in regular religious activities?” 403 
The sample of believers had a balanced gender distribution (54% female) and an age distribution ranging 404 
from 18 to 77 (M = 35.60, SD = 12.98). The majority of these participants (74.1%) reported that they 405 
have not previously participated in an experiment involving PD games. An equal number of atheists, 406 
recruited to avoid deception, were selected among those who answered “Non-religious” to the religious 407 
affiliation question and who then qualified their answer as “Atheist” in the follow-up question “Which of 408 
the following do you most identify as?”. Participants with complete submissions earned a participation 409 
fee ($0.25), in addition to their earnings from the PD game. 410 
Materials and Procedure 411 
Materials. A copy of the experimental materials is available at the OSF study preregistration page 412 
(https://osf.io/kzwgn/). 413 
Procedure. We conducted the experiment using the Qualtrics software (https://www.qualtrics.com/). 414 
After eliciting informed consent, participants received training on the slider tool to increase their 415 
familiarity with the interface for eliciting PD decisions35. They next read a general description of the 416 
study, explaining that there were three parts and that after the study was over one part was to be 417 
selected at random for determining participant’s additional payments from the study. Participants were 418 
not informed about the tasks involved in upcoming parts beforehand. The first part included the main 419 
task, the one-shot PD game, whereas the other two parts included exploratory measures of social 420 
dilemma comprehension and social expectations (see below). The procedure for randomly selecting one 421 
of the three parts for determining additional payments is an effective cost-saving method, well-422 
established in experimental economics77, with theoretical support for its incentive-compatibility78 and 423 
significant evidence that participants consider each part independently79,80.  424 
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The main task was a one-shot PD game and included the experimental manipulations. 425 
Compliance with time-limits was incentivized to strengthen cognitive manipulations35. After reading the 426 
instructions for the PD game at their own pace, a transitory screen explained the time-limits and the 427 
monetary incentives for compliance. This screen was displayed for at most 30s or less if participants 428 
choose to proceed earlier, allowing time for reading while preventing deliberation about the upcoming 429 
task. Next came the PD decision screen, which first revealed—for participants in the identity 430 
manipulation conditions—an “online profile” of each participant’s pair in the game and, after two 431 
seconds, displayed the slider tool and a timer. The PD decision was elicited under one of two time-limit 432 
conditions (i.e., 10s time-pressure or 20s time-delay). Afterward, manipulation checks and exploratory 433 
measures were elicited, followed by a brief questionnaire including basic demographic information.  434 
Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD). We used a one-shot continuous prisoner’s dilemma (PD) game, relying on 435 
instructions used in the previous literature39. In the PD, a pair of participants individually decided, 436 
without observing each other’s actions, how much of $0.50 to keep and how much of it to allocate (in 1 437 
cent increments) to their pair. Amount allocated to the pair (whole number ranging from 0 to 50 cents) 438 
is our measure of cooperation. If PD was selected for payment, participants earned double the amount 439 
allocated to them by their pair in addition to any money they kept for themselves. From each 440 
participant’s perspective, the game involved a strict trade-off between personal earnings and total 441 
earnings by the two participants, rendering it a social dilemma. In a previous social dilemma experiment 442 
on Prolific (N = 3,653), using a four-person public good game with marginal per capita return of 0.5, we 443 
found that 63.6% of endowments was given to the public good (SD = 29.6), that 6.4% of participants 444 
gave nothing and that 25.1% gave everything (Isler, Gächter, Maule & Starmer, unpublished 445 
manuscript). With substantially lower time and effort required for its completion (the median 446 
completion time was 5 minutes), our study provides a ratio between endowment size and opportunity 447 
cost that is comparable to laboratory studies. Furthermore, a large-scale meta-analysis found no overall 448 
effect of stakes on giving in dictator games81 and similar findings are reported elsewhere82–86. Finally, a 449 
recent study found evidence of religious prosociality in low-stake ($1) games using explicit primes87. 450 
Group assignment. Practicing Christians played the PD game in equal probability either with another 451 
practicing Christian (In-Group), with an atheist (Out-Group) or with someone without identity 452 
information (No-Group). Participants did not know that they had been recruited based on their religious 453 
identity because the prescreening questions were elicited beforehand by Prolific. Participants in the 454 
identity manipulation conditions (but not those in the control condition) were informed on the PD 455 
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instruction screen that the decision screen would show an “online profile” describing their pair in the 456 
game. Specifically, modifying a previously established method10, the decision screen revealed (in 457 
balanced Latin Square order) other participant’s religious identity (“Christian” or “Atheist”) together 458 
with four constant, in-group identity information categories (country of residence, age group, language, 459 
and experimental platform). This approach was intended to minimize demand characteristics (since 460 
deciding based on multiple identity categories makes religious belief less focal) and to increase the 461 
realism of the experimental setting (since acquiring information from social media profiles with these 462 
kinds of group identity categories is a familiar experience). Identity information was paired with symbols 463 
to speed comprehension (e.g., the Christian cross, the atheism symbol, a map of the US, etc.). 464 
Time-limit manipulations. The PD decision was elicited either under 10s time-pressure (TP) with prompts 465 
to “be quick” or under 20s time-delay (TD) with prompts to “carefully consider” the decision. Based on 466 
previously developed methods, we incentivized compliance with time-limits35, and we informed 467 
participants that additional earnings from the PD were highly likely to be invalidated by noncompliance. 468 
The uncertainty prevents the annulment of incentivization that could otherwise occur in cases of non-469 
compliance. We in fact randomly chose 90% of noncompliant decisions to be invalid. We did not inform 470 
participants of the probability of invalidation for noncompliance (p = 0.9) so as not to induce a 471 
calculative mindset. 472 
Control Measures 473 
We planned various controls to check whether: (1) our manipulations affected decision processes as 474 
intended, (2) the information used for sample selection is accurate, (3) our sample is representative in 475 
that it replicates well-established behavioural biases, and our results are (4) robust when controlling for 476 
experience and comprehension in the PD game and (5) specific to religious believers or generalizable to 477 
other natural groups. Since we did not find evidence for intuitive cooperation, we followed our 478 
preregistered procedure and did not conduct the last control measure (5) (see Results generalisability 479 
check). 480 
Manipulation checks. We committed to three tests to check that our manipulations worked as intended. 481 
First, as a behavioural test of time-limit manipulations, we checked whether the median response time 482 
under time-pressure was faster than the median response time under time-delay using a Wilcoxon rank-483 
sum test. In addition, immediately following the PD game, three questions were elicited in two randomly 484 
presented screens to check that time-limit and religious group identity conditions manipulated cognitive 485 
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processes as intended. On the time manipulation check screen, participants rated in random order their 486 
agreement with two statements on a 5-point scale: 1) “I did not have time to think through my 487 
decisions” (indicating limited opportunities for deliberation), 2) “I decided based on my ‘gut reaction’” 488 
(indicating increased spontaneity of decisions). As an indication of successful manipulation of cognitive 489 
processes by time-limits, an independent samples t-test of significant differences in average scores for 490 
the two questions between the two time-limit conditions was estimated. On the group identity 491 
manipulation check screen, participants completed the online version of the Inclusion of the Other in 492 
the Self (IOS) Scale, a simple and reliable measure of subjective closeness of social relationships88. The 7-493 
point IOS question asked active participants to select one of seven pairs of circles with increasing areas 494 
of intersection that best described the relationship between the active participant (“You”) and the 495 
passive participant (“Other”). Successful group manipulation would be indicated by a significant 496 
difference in an independent samples t-test between the In-Group and Out-Group conditions.  497 
Screening information check. Information on religious affiliations and practices was previously elicited by 498 
Prolific. We used two of these questions as screening criteria during data collection (see the Participants 499 
section above). The survey section of our study also elicited answers to these same questions, to check 500 
the accuracy of the information used in the selection of practicing Christians. Prior to data collection, we 501 
committed to reporting the hypothesis test results based on the identity information elicited in our 502 
survey if the match rate on the religious affiliation question was less than 90%. In fact, this match rate 503 
was 95.9%. However, because the match rate was 82.0% when considering questions about both 504 
religious affiliation and participation in public rituals, we report the hypothesis test results for this 505 
restricted sample as part of the exploratory analysis. 506 
Sample behaviour check. The design allows a test of whether our sample of believers is representative in 507 
showing commonly observed biases. A significant main effect of religious group identity in the two-way 508 
ANOVA, such that believers cooperate more with other believers than with atheists, would replicate the 509 
commonly observed group bias.  510 
Experience and comprehension check. The PD game was described in a survey question to elicit 511 
participants’ experience with the game from past participation in experiments. In addition, we 512 
measured comprehension of the social dilemma by eliciting via sliders what participants thought were 513 
the self-gain maximizing strategy (i.e., keeping all endowment for self) and the group-gain maximizing 514 
strategy (i.e., giving all endowment to the recipient) in the PD game. Participants had the opportunity to 515 
earn $0.25 for each correct answer. Those who incorrectly answered either question can be considered 516 
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as having miscomprehended the social dilemma. As standard36, we did not exclude those with 517 
miscomprehension or experience from the confirmatory analysis. In exploratory models, we either 518 
controlled for them as covariates (M1a-b and M4a-b) or excluded them from analysis (M2a-b and M3a-519 
b). 520 
Result generalisability check. As compared to atheists, practicing believers are more likely to have 521 
experienced cooperative interactions (and adopted cooperative intuitions) based on religious identity. 522 
Conditional on finding evidence for the hypothesis of intuitive cooperation among believers, we planned 523 
to test for intuitive cooperation among atheists to check whether intuitive cooperation extends to other 524 
natural groups. Given no evidence was found for intuitive cooperation, we will report atheist behaviour 525 
elsewhere. 526 
Additional Measures 527 
Expected cooperation. Participants predicted the allocation made by their pair. To incentivize truthful 528 
reporting of expectations, participants had the opportunity to earn $0.50 for predictions that were 529 
accurate within 5 cents. Expectations provide a measure of trust towards one’s pair89. We explore if 530 
differences in expected cooperation are consistent with differences in actual cooperation behaviour 531 
(e.g., group bias). 532 
Decision Conflict. We elicited self-reported subjective conflict experienced during the PD decision. The 533 
measure, based on previous literature55, uses a scale ranging from 0 (not at all) to 100 (very much) as 534 
response to the question “Some participants find it difficult to make a decision regarding how much 535 
money to keep personally and how much to share with others because they find the two goals equally 536 
important. To what extent did you experience such a conflict when making your decision?” We explore 537 
whether experimental manipulations affected the experience of decision conflict. 538 
Data exclusions  539 
As preregistered, incomplete (n = 77) and duplicate (n = 19) submissions were excluded from the 540 
analyses. We considered a submission to be complete if it had a valid Prolific ID, which anonymously 541 
referred to a unique participant, and if all parts, including the survey, had been completed. Based on 542 
Prolific ID, we excluded duplicate submissions except for the initial submission, if this initial submission 543 
was complete and if it did not coincide in time with another submission by the same participant.  544 
Protocol registration 545 
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The Stage 1 protocol for this Registered Report was accepted in principle on 28 January 2020. The 546 
protocol, as accepted by the journal, can be found at https://doi.org/10.6084/m9.figshare.12086781.v1.  547 
Data availability 548 
The data are available at the OSF study preregistration page (https://osf.io/kzwgn/). 549 
Code availability  550 
The analysis code is available at the OSF study preregistration page (https://osf.io/kzwgn/). 551 
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Figure legends 743 
Fig. 1 | Group identity manipulations. Participants previously self-described as Christians regularly 744 
participating in public religious rituals (n = 1,280) were either not shown identity information of their PD 745 
game partner or assigned to one of two social media profile conditions: a, the In-Group condition where 746 
their partner was described as a practicing Christian or to, b, the Out-Group condition where their 747 
partner was described as atheist. The additional information on the profiles did not vary across the two 748 
conditions. The positions of the five information items were counterbalanced. The data from an equal 749 
number of atheists, recruited to avoid deception, are not analysed here in detail. The figure displays a 750 
simplified version of the actual images used in the study. 751 
 752 
Fig. 2 | Cooperation among believers across experimental conditions. Cooperation (i.e., amount 753 
transferred to one’s pair in the PD game out of an endowment of 50 cents) among 1,280 previously self-754 
reported practicing Christians under 10s time-pressure (TP) and 20s time-delay (TD) towards 755 
coreligionists (In-Group), atheists (Out-Group) or pairs without identity information (No-Group). Box 756 
plots indicate the mean (diamonds), the median (centre line), the upper and lower quartiles (box limits), 757 
and the first quartile including the minimum (whiskers). 758 
 759 
Fig. 3 | Difference in cooperation among believers between time-limit conditions (TD - TP). Difference 760 
in mean cooperation by practicing Christians in the PD game between time-delay (TD) and time-pressure 761 
(TP) conditions as a percentage of cooperation in TP. a, Complete sample of believers (M1a, n = 1,280). 762 
b, Those without experience of PD experiments (M2a, n = 948). c, Those with correct social dilemma 763 
comprehension (M3a, n = 713). d, Current practicing Christians (M4a, n = 1,050). Cooperation indicates 764 
monetary allocations in the PD game towards coreligionists (In-Group), atheists (Out-Group) or pairs 765 




Table 1. Cooperation among believers across four exploratory models 768 
    M1a: Complete  M2a: Inexperienced  M3a: Comprehended M4a: Current 







 In-Group 30.7 18.8 204 31.7 18.5 148 32.0 19.7 104 32.2 18.2 164 
Out-Group 29.6 18.9 231 30.1 18.8 165 27.6 19.9 141 29.9 18.7 188 
No-Group 30.8 18.8 227 30.8 18.6 184 30.6 19.0 120 31.2 18.5 188 





 In-Group 34.0 17.9 214 34.3 17.8 146 34.6 18.4 130 35.3 17.2 179 
Out-Group 30.1 18.4 215 30.5 18.5 169 31.3 19.4 121 30.9 18.5 172 
No-Group 32.9 17.6 189 32.8 17.8 136 35.0 18.4 97 33.6 17.1 159 






 Time-Limit .004 (0, .013] .028 .003 [0, .014] .088 .009 (0, .027] .014 .004 (0, .015] .041 
Group Identity .003 [0, .011] .151 .004 [0, .014] .158 .009 (0, .026] .044 .004 [0, .014] .111 
Interaction .002 [0, .008] .330 .001 [0, .009] .501 .000 [0, .005] .866 .001 [0, .007] .609 
Note. Cooperation by practicing Christians in the PD game analysed across four exploratory models: 769 
(M1a) the complete experimental sample, (M2a) among those inexperienced with the PG game, (M3a) 770 
among those who comprehended the social dilemma, and (M4a) among those who currently identify as 771 
practicing Christian. The top two blocks describe cooperation mean (M), standard deviation of 772 
cooperation (SD) and number of observations in condition (n) by time-limits (Pressure or Delay) and 773 
group identity manipulations (In-Group, Out-Group or No-Group). The bottom block describes effect size 774 
(ηp2), 95% confidence interval (CI) and significance level (P) for the main effects of time-limits and group 775 
identity manipulations and their interaction in the corresponding two-way ANOVA models. 776 
 777 
Table 2. Cooperation among all participants across four exploratory models 778 
    M1b: Complete  M2b: Inexperienced  M3b: Comprehended M4b: Current 







 In-Group 32.4 18.7 404 32.4 18.6 288 32.8 19.4 254 33.3 18.3 364 
Out-Group 29.4 18.8 443 29.7 18.7 311 28.0 19.6 285 29.5 18.8 400 
No-Group 30.3 18.5 445 30.9 18.0 333 30.3 18.7 266 30.5 18.3 406 





 In-Group 33.7 18.1 427 34.6 17.6 292 33.3 18.9 260 34.3 17.8 392 
Out-Group 29.7 19.2 423 30.7 19.1 322 30.6 20.2 270 30.0 19.3 380 
No-Group 32.4 18.1 418 32.9 17.6 291 33.1 19.1 252 32.7 17.9 388 







Participant Type .000 [0, .001] .999 .000 [0, .003] .686 .000 [0, .005] .396 .000 [0, .004] .398 
Time-Limit .002 (0, .007] .026 .003 (0, .010] .015 .003 (0, .011] .029 .002 (0, .007] .045 
Group Identity .006 (0, .013] .001 .005 (0, .013] .009 .007 (0, .016] .005 .007 (0, .015] .001 
Interaction .001 [0, .004] .380 .000 [0, .003] .675 .000 [0, .001] .923 .000 [0, .003] .693 
Note. Cooperation by practicing Christians and atheists in the PD game analysed across four exploratory 779 
models: (M1b) the complete experimental sample, (M2b) among those inexperienced with the PG 780 
game, (M3b) among those who comprehended the social dilemma, and (M4b) among those who 781 
currently identify as practicing Christian or atheist. The top two blocks describe cooperation mean (M), 782 
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standard deviation of cooperation (SD) and number of observations in condition (n) by time-limits 783 
(Pressure or Delay) and group identity manipulations (In-Group, Out-Group or No-Group). The bottom 784 
block describes effect size (ηp2), 95% confidence interval (CI) and significance level (P) for the main 785 
effects of participant type (believer or atheist), time-limits and group identity manipulations and the 786 
three-way interaction in the corresponding three-way ANOVA models. None of the two-way interactions 787 
were significant (Ps ≥ .142). 788 
 
 
 
